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NOTE
SUBSECTION (e) OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964
I. INTRODUCTION
The Criminal Justice Act of 19641 was enacted "to promote the
cause of criminal justice by providing for the representation of de-
fendants who are financially unable to obtain an adequate defense
in criminal cases in the courts of the United States."2 The Act
requires each United States district court to place in operation for the
benefit of certain indigent defendants a plan designed to provide
for the appointment,4 and payment of counsel, 5 and for certain
auxiliary services.' The purpose of this note is to examine factors
that will influence courts in establishing a criteria for applying sub-
section (e) which provides for services other than counsel.
In 1963 the President of the United States stated in a letter to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives:
In the typical criminal case the resources of government are pitted
against those of the individual. To guarantee a fair trial under such
circumstances requires that each accused person have ample oppor-
tunity to gather evidence, and prepare and present his cause. When-
ever the lack of money prevents a defendant from securing an
experienced lawyer, trained investigator or technical expert, an un-
just conviction may follow.7
An accompanying letter from the Attorney General stated:
[T]he bill establishes an adequate defense standard under which
representation in a criminal case is recognized as involving more
than a lawyer alone. It requires making available to counsel those
auxiliary investigative, expert, and other services frequently essen-
tial to ascertaining the facts and making the judgments upon which
to prepare and present the defendant's case.8
Subsection (e) is a portion of the finished product of the proposed
legislation to which these letters referred.
1 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
2 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 631.
8 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a).
4 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b).
5 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d).
6 "Counsel for a defendant who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert
or other services necessary to an adequate defense in his case may request them in an
ex parte application." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e). (Emphasis added.)
7 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2993.
8 Id. at 2995.
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A. Eligibility
All but two classes of criminal indigents appear to be eligible for
benefits under the Act.' First, the Act provides for representation
by counsel and other services for those defendants charged with
felonies or misdemeanors, other than petty offenses as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1.10 This, by definition, would exclude defendants charged
with petty offenses from the benefits of the Act. Secondly, subsection
(e) provides that counsel may request necessary services.1 This use
of the word counsel raises the question of whether the indigent de-
fendant who has waived his right to counsel and is financially unable
to obtain the needed services may move the court in propia persona
for auxiliary services or whether such a motion is limited to counsel.
This problem will be discussed below.
B. Procedure
The procedure for obtaining the auxiliary services is as follows:
counsel for the defendant requests the services in an ex parte ap-
plication.22 The court must find that the services requested are neces-
sary and that the defendant is financially unable to obtain them. The
court then authorizes counsel to obtain such services on behalf of
the defendant. The organization or person rendering the services
must file a claim for compensation, supported by an affidavit specify-
ing time expended, services rendered, expenses incurred, and com-
pensation received in the same case or for the same services from
any other source. The court then determines a reasonable compensa-
tion for the services and directs payment."
However, the court may, "in the interests of justice, and upon a
finding that timely procurement of necessary services could not
await prior authorization, ratify such services after they have been
9 For an analysis of financial inability see Carter and Hauser, The Criminal justice
Act of 1964, 37 F.R.D. 67 (1964).
10 A petty offense is any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed im.-
prisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500 or both. 18
U.S.C. § 1(3).
11 "Counsel for a defendant who is financially unable .... " 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e).
12 S. 1057, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3006A(d) (1963) did not originally require an
ex parle application. However, the bill was amended to include this provision "to pro-
tect the accused from premature disclosure of his case" in open hearing. 109 CONG. REC.
14219, 14233 (1963). In contrast, FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b), providing for the subpoena
of witnesses at government expense for the indigent defendant, does not provide for
secrecy with respect to defendant's motion. Thomas v. United States, 168 F.2d 707 (5th
Cir. 1948). There is a proposed amendment to Rule 17(b) to require an ex parle ap-
plication in such situations. Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 411, 426
(1964).
13 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e).
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obtained."'14 The plan adopted by the Southern District of California
under the Criminal Justice Act has such a provision.'5
In either event, the Act provides that the compensation to be paid
for such service shall not exceed 300 dollars exclusive of reimburse-
ment for expenses reasonably incurred. 10 It is important to note that
this 300 dollar limitation applies to each individual service approved,
and is not a maximum limitation on all services rendered to an indi-
gent defendant. Thus one of the considerations necessarily involved
in the granting of services will be the cost, especially since the de-
fendant will feel that the more services he receives the better his
chances of acquittal will be even though they would merely be cumu-
lative in effect.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
The report by the committee appointed to implement the Criminal
Justice Act' 7 recommended that the "allowances of petitions for
investigative services be strictly limited, to the extent possible, to
those charges necessary in the strictest sense of the word." 18 The
report by the ad hoc committee appointed to develop rules, proce-
dures and guidelines for an assigned counsel system'0 indicated that
one of the problems with the Act is the lack of a standard or criterion
to guide the courts, other than that of necessity for the services. The
report suggests:
To guarantee against possible abuses in the use of investigative and
expert services, other than counsel services, a system for evaluating
the need for these services, determining that they have been per-
formed competently, and insuring the reasonableness of payments
requested, seems desirable and necessary.20
To establish a standard for evaluating the need for such ancillary
14 Ibid.
15 "In every instance the attorney should use all reasonable efforts to file an applica.
tion and secure prior authorization for investigative, expert or other services alleged to
be necessary to an adequate defense. The Court will look with disfavor on claims for
such services rendered without a prior application and the burden will be upon the
counsel for the defendant to show, in the interests of justice, that 'timely procurement
of necessary services could not await prior authorization.'" PLAN FOR R13PRESENTATION
OF DEFENDANTS IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA UNDER THE CRIMINAL
JusTIcE ACT OF 1964. § VII(3) (1965); This provision follows the suggestion set
down by the Committee to implement the Act, Report on Criminal justice Act, 36
F.R.D. 277, 290 (1965).
10 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e).
17 Report on Criminal Justice Act, supra note 15, at 285.
18 Id. at 290.
19 Id. at 376.
20 Id. at 383.
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services, one must first determine if there is a constitutional right to
services other than the assistance of counsel. Such a right may be
within the due process clause of the fifth amendment2' as applied to
the federal courts, but as yet no case has so held. However, certain
decisions under the fourteenth amendmente 2 indicate that a de-
fendant may have a constitutional right to the services provided for
by subsection (e). In Griffin V. Illinois,-8 the Supreme Court stated
that the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment were violated by the state's denial of appellate review
solely on account of a defendant's inability to pay for a transcript.
The Court stated: "[O]ur own constitutional guaranties of due
process and equal protection both called for procedures in criminal
trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and
different groups of persons"" and, "there can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has." 25
The extent to which a state must afford the indigent defendant
the same opportunities afforded a non-indigent under the Griffin case
has not yet been determined. Douglas v. Green26 found a violation
of the fourteenth amendment when the highest court of a state does
not afford an indigent an adequate remedy for the prosecution of an
appeal without payment of docket fees. Lane v. Brown 7 stated that
the State of Indiana had deprived the petitioner of a right secured by
the fourteenth amendment by refusing him appellate review of the
denial of coram nobis solely because of his poverty. Other cases have
reiterated an indigent defendant's right at least to access to appellate
review.2 8
21 "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22 "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
23 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
24 Id. at 17.
25 Id. at 19.
26 363 U.S. 192 (1960).
27 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
28 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708
(1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) ; Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of
Prison T. & P., 357 U.S. 214 (1958). That the circumstances of the particular case will
sometimes require an affrmance of the conviction is shown by Norvell v. Illinois, 373
U.S. 420 (1963), where the court held that without violating due process or equal
protection requirements a State may deny post-conviction relief where a transcript was
unavailable due to the death of the court reporter, where the indigent defendant had
the services of a lawyer at the trial but did not appeal at that time.
1966]
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In 1963 the Court in Douglas v. California"' stated that the
refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent under a California rule of
criminal procedure authorizing denial of motions for appointment
of counsel on appeal where, after an independent investigation of the
record, the appellate court determined that appointment of counsel
would be helpful to neither the defendant nor the court, violated
the fourteenth amendment: "The indigent, where the record is
unclear or the errors hidden, has only the right to a meaningless
ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal."80 The Douglas
case therefore concerned itself not only with access to the appellate
court, but also with the quality of review afforded there.
The Griffin-Douglas cases do not make it clear whether equal pro-
tection, or due process, or both, are the basis for the decisions,81
leading one writer to suggest that such an ambiguity seems too con-
sistent to be fortuitous. 2 The basis of the decisions becomes impor-
tant when analogizing these cases to the federal system, for there is
no equal protection clause which applies to the federal government.88
Griffin and Douglas can be analyzed on an equal protection basis
as follows: The equal protection clause prohibits "discriminating
and partial legislation ... in favor of particular persons as against
others in like condition. 84 Even though the law itself is impartial
in appearance, if it is applied so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances it
is void.85 A legislative scheme which allows an appeal from a trial
court's conviction provided the defendant can pay for a transcript is
an invidious discrimination between the indigent and non-indigent
and a denial of equal protection of the law. (Griffin.) A legislative
scheme which allows an appeal as a matter of right but which
29 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
80 Id. at 357-58.
81 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 18 states: "Consequently at all stages of the pro-
ceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners
from invidious discriminations." Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. at 356-57 states: "But
it is appropriate to observe that a State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to a denial of due
process or an 'invidious discrimination.' . . . But where the merits of the one and only
appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an
unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor."
82 The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 62, 105 (1963).
3a Hirabyashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) states: "The Fifth Amend-
ment contains no equal protection clause and it restrains only such discriminatory
legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process."
34 Minneapolis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1889).
85 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
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permits the appellate judge to deny the assistance of counsel to indi-
gents which may deny the indigent a meaningful appeal is an in-
vidious discrimination violating the equal protection clause and
therefore void. (Douglas.)
A due process analysis might proceed as follows: "No State shall
...deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."36 "The words due process of law 'were intended to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private
rights and distributive justice.' ,,87 The question is, "Is it a funda-
mental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea
of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such a
government ?"-8 A legislative scheme which requires that a defendant
have sufficient funds to afford a transcript as a condition of appeal
violates those fundamental principles of liberty and justice. (Grifin.)
Likewise, a legislative scheme which permits the appellate judge to
deny the assistance of counsel to an indigent for his appeal violates
those same standards. (Douglas.) 39
-On either basis these cases are fraught with dicta showing concern
for the indigent's rights at all stages of the proceeding,40 and the
reasoning of the cases would apply to any situation where the refusal
to grant investigative or expert services resulted in such an "invidious
discrimination" that the defendant was deprived of a meaningful
defense.
III. RIGHT TO SERVICES AS HERETOFORE PRESENTED
IN STATE COURTS
In United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,41 it was held that the de-
fendant was not denied due process by the Pennsylvania trial court's
86 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
87 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908), quoting Bank of Columbia v.
Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 126 (1819).
38 Twining v. New Jersey, supra note 37, at 106.
39 One difficulty in finding Douglas or Griffin to be based on due process, despite the
reference to the term, is that the Court did not expressly overrule McKane v. Dourston,
153 U.S. 684 (1894), which held that it is not a violation of due process for a state to
deny review by an appellate court of a final judgment in a criminal case. Therefore it
would seem that any due process argument must rest on the invidious discrimination
language of Griffin. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
40 E.g., "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
upon the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 19; "[TIhe Four-
teenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and
its hand extends as far to each." Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961).
41 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir.), aft'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1951).
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refusal to appoint a psychiatrist at state expense for the exclusive
assistance of the defendant where other psychiatrists were utilized at
the trial.
Bush v. Texas42 involved a claim of a constitutional right to
services in addition to the assistance of counsel, under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Petitioner claimed a denial of
due process based on (1) the trial court's refusal, prior to trial, either
to send him to a state mental institution for observation and diag-
nosis before requiring him to stand trial or to appoint and pay for a
competent psychiatrist for that purpose; and (2) the alleged denial
by the trial court of adequate time for proper examination and
diagnosis by a psychologist who appeared at the trial upon request of
petitioner's counsel. The Supreme Court, in declining to anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it, remanded the case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for
consideration in light of subsequent developments. The Court's
action indicated a reluctance to apply the due process clause alone to
secure equal rights of indigent defendants, possibly because the due
process clause has been considered a rather unwieldy weapon:
[The due process clause] tends to secure equality of law in the
sense that it makes a required minimum of protection for everyone's
right of life, liberty and property, which the Congress or the legis-
lature may not withhold.43
The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of
prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore,
we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases.
But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjusti-
fiable as to be violative of due process.44
Also, even when held applicable to a particular situation, due process
has been stated to be difficult to apply to subsequent situations:
"[H]ypothetical situations can be conjured up, shading impercep-
tibly from the circumstances of this case and by gradations producing
practical differences despite seemingly logical extensions. '46 Further-
more, one of the biggest problems involved in applying due process
is that it affects every jurisdiction in the United States. Where every
state has its own system of criminal procedure, a decision that a par-
ticular mode of handling a criminal trial violates due process could
42 372 U.S. 586 (1964).
43 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921).
44 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
45 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
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have disastrous effects on the administration of criminal justice
throughout the United States. Therefore, it seems likely that if and
when the Griffin-Douglas rationale is applied to expert and investi-
gatory services the Court, if it can, will rest its decision on equal pro-
tection rather than due process.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
The Court has dealt with situations where decisions based on the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment were ques-
tioned in a federal jurisdiction. The Court on certiorari in Shelley v.
Kraemer4 refused to enforce a restrictive covenant in a deed which
prohibited sale of real property to Negroes, based on the equal pro-
tection clause. Hurd v. Hodge,47 considered at the same time, in-
volved a similar problem in Washington D.C., where the equal pro-
tection clause does not apply. Here the Court found an 1866 civil
rights law applicable but stated:
It is not consistent with the public policy of the United States to
permit federal courts in the Nation's capital to exercise general
equitable powers to compel action denied the state courts where such
state action has been held to be violative of the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws. We cannot presume that the public
policy of the United States manifests a lesser concern for the pro-
tection of such basic rights against discriminatory action of federal
courts than against such action taken by the courts of the States. 48
The Court could use the Criminal Justice Act itself to enforce
the same standard upon the federal courts as the equal protection
clause enforces upon the states, or it could resort to the public policy
argument used in Hurd. Other cases have shown a trend to construe
federal statutes to bring about more equal treatment of criminal
defendants. In Coppedge v. United States4 the Court held that a
federal statute50 authorizing any court of the United States to allow
indigent persons to prosecute, defend or appeal suits without pre-
payment of costs means that the court must grant indigents a cost-
free appeal unless the appellate court would also have dismissed a
non-indigent's appeal. The court of appeals in Leach v. United
States"' found an abuse of the trial court's discretion in declining to
48 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
47 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
48 Id. at 35-36.
49 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
60 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1948).
51 334 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
1966]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
refer defendant for a psychiatric examination as provided by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code where the defendant was an indigent unable
to present psychiatric information directed to the separate issue of
sentencing.
Rule 17 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 2 provides
that the court may order the issuance of a subpoena upon motion or
request of an indigent defendant and that the cost incurred by the
service of process and the fees of the witness so subpoenaed shall
be paid in the same manner in which similar costs and fees are paid
in case of a witness subpoenaed in behalf of the government. The
courts of appeal have shown a divergence of opinion regarding the
standard to be applied to the granting or denial of these services,
as indicated by the following paragraphs.
Taylor v. United States53 involved the denial of defendant's re-
quest that the trial court subpoena three psychiatrists, where de-
fendant's sole defense was insanity. The court of appeals held that
the defendant's right to subpoena witnesses rested not only on Rule
17(b) but also on the sixth amendment, which provides that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. It also held that
this right is not absolute, but rather that a wide discretion with
regard to subpoenaing witnesses at government expense is vested in
the district court to prevent abuse and an appellate court will not
disturb the exercise of that discretion unless exceptional circum-
stances compel it. The court found that such exceptional circum-
stances existed and reversed the decision. 4
Greenwell v. United States"5 suggests another test:
[I]f the accused avers facts which, if true, would be relevant to any
issue in the case, the requests for subpoenas must be granted, unless
the averments are inherently incredible on their face, or unless the
Government shows, either by introducing evidence or from matters
already of record, that the averments are untrue or that the request is
otherwise frivolous.56
In Brown v. United States,5 7 the court reversed a conviction on the
52 18 U.S.C. Rule 17(b) (1945).
53 329 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1964).
54 For a contrary result under the same holding, see Reistroffer v. United States, 258
F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1958).
55 317 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
56 Id. at 110.
57 331 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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ground that the refusal to issue a subpoena under Rule 17 (b) where
the averments in the motions were not "inherently incredible on their
face," nor was there evidence "that the averments were untrue or
that the request is otherwise frivolous,"58 was reversible error.
V. CONCLUSION
That the Greenwell test of frivolity is not practical to apply to
subsection (e) is suggested by the fact that the necessity for services
is not determined in an adversary proceeding. The Greenwell test
requires that the averments be inherently incredible on their face or
shown by the government to be frivolous. Where there is no oppor-
tunity for the government to make such a showing, as in an ex parte
proceeding, the court must of necessity make the inquiry. This would
indicate that the trial judge must be given the wide discretion advo-
cated in the Taylor case.
Though the trial judge may have this broad discretion, the appel-
late courts will be able to examine whether a refusal to grant services
resulted in an "invidious discrimination" rendering the trial a mean-
ingless ritual. Certain considerations would lessen the likelihood of
such an occurrence:
1. The court should inquire whether the defendant may obtain
the desired information by stipulation, as provided for in the Plan
for the Southern District of California. "
2. Where investigative services are desired to locate witnesses
likely to testify for the prosecution, for the purpose of impeaching
or developing inconsistencies in their testimony, much expense can
be saved if the United States Attorney is willing to provide a list of
witnesses he intends to call.
3. Investigative services directed toward establishing an essential
element of the defense, such as a particular witness who can corro-
borate the defendant's alibi, should be favored over "fishing expedi-
tions" hoping to unearth something favorable to the defendant.
4. Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 0 provides
that the court may appoint expert witnesses agreed upon by the
parties, and may appoint witnesses of its own selection, both of
whom are subject to cross-examination by each party. Requests for
58 Id. at 823.
59 Op. cit. supra note 15, at § VII (7).
60 18 U.S.C. Rule 28 (1945).
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services of an expert should be viewed in the light that an impartial
expert might be appointed under Rule 28 which would avoid pitting
the Government's experts against the defendant's experts.
Probably one of the first problems the federal courts will have to
face will be where (1) an indigent defendant waives appointment of
counsel, (2) and then demands an investigative or expert service
which is necessary to an adequate defense, (3) and the trial court
refuses on the grounds that subsection (e) contemplates adminis-
tration of the services only through counsel, since the Act by its terms
precludes payment for services unless the defendant is represented
by counsel."' To apply a due process requirement to the services
would impress a duty to provide services in every jurisdiction in the
United States. The result would be a rather clear lack of equal pro-
tection in the federal courts, there being an unreasonable discrimi-
nation between those indigent defendants who are represented by
counsel and those who have waived the appointment of counsel.
The court would be faced with construing the Act as meaning "Coun-
sel, or if counsel has been waived, defendant, may request . .. ."
or that the public policy of the United States requires that no such
"invidious discrimination" between indigent defendants shall be
made.
Jo. N. TURNnR
61 That the specification of counsel is not a mere legislative oversight is indicated
by the fact that the forms recommended by the Judicial Council, CJA forms 8 (Applica.
tion), 9 (Voucher), and 10 (Ratification), 36 F.R.D. 310-12, require that the attorney
for the defendant execute the documents; the Plan for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia note 15 supra, at VII provides that the attorney handle the requests for services.
